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of public-key cryptosystems as well as for other tasks of the secure channel (digital signature, authentication, etc.) based on such methods.
From the known cryptosystems it appears that there is a trade off between the secure channel and the complexity of the encryption/decryption processes. In this work, we propose a new secure cryptosystem, based on the preliminary bridge built between error-correcting codes and cryptosystems by McEliece [3] with the following features and ingredients: (a) The complexity of the encryption/decryption processes scale linearly with the size of the plaintext N . These complexities can be easily reduced even further under parallel dynamics. (b) The method is based on boolean operations between two sparse matrices, in contrast of factorizing large integers in cryptosystems based on number theory. (c) Our method consists of many stochastic ingredients; Bob adds noise to the public-key whereas Alice adds noise to the ciphertext. (d) The method is applicable as a public-key cryptosystem, as well as for digital signatures and authentication. A digital signature is used to specify the person responsible for the message, and an authentication ensures the integrity of the plaintexts constructing the message. [1] It is a challenge to have a secure public-key cryptosystem operating with low complexity which can serve also for all the different tasks of the secure channel.
Before describing the details of our method, let us first categorize the possible capabilities of Oscar: (a) An eavesdropper: Oscar may try to reveal the plaintext Alice is sending to Bob from the transmitted ciphertext and/or the digital signature. (b) A distruptor: The message Alice is sending to Bob can be repeated, replaced or corrupted during transmission by Oscar. We may distinguish between a forged meaningful/meaningless signed plaintext. Note that the ability to forge many meaningless but legally signed messages could cause a disastrous effect in the event of real-time procedures. It may take some critical time for Bob to realize that legally signed messages are forged messages rather than noisy ones. Note that in cryptosystems such as RSA, [2] it is easy to forge a meaningless signed message or to repeat the transmission of the same message or previously legally signed messages to Bob.
Our cryptosystem is based on an error correcting method known as the Gallager method [4] or its MN version. [5, 6, 7] It comprises two sparse boolean matrices, A and B, of dimensionalities M ×N and M ×M respectively, and the rate R ≡ N/M ≤ 1. Note that all operations are in (mod 2). The encryption public-key is an M × N matrix
and the encrypted ciphertext is
Before the transmission, Alice adds noise (bits flipped with probability f ) to C, such that the received ciphertext is
where n represents the noise. The decryption key
is known only to Bob, who can find s by multiplying r with the matrix B to obtain z = B (E k s + n) = As + Bn . It requires solving the equation
where s ′ and n ′ are the unknowns, but their statistics (for instance, unbiased message for s ′ , and flip rate f for n ′ ) are known. This may be carried out using standard methods such as that of belief network decoding. [5] In this method, representing a special case of parity-check codes, each bit of the ciphertext C is derived from the parity of a sum of certain plaintext's bits. It has recently been shown, based on insight gained from the study of diluted spin systems [8] that specific choices of cascading sub-matrices A and B can nearly saturate Shannon's bound. [6, 7] With the lack of noise and invertible E k (otherwise decryption cannot be terminated successfully with probability one), Oscar is able to easily recover s = E −1 k r. In order to make Oscar's task more difficult, we follow the line of McEliese where noise is added to C, namely, bits are flipped (0 → 1 or 1 → 0) with probability f . [1] In this event E −1 k r results in an approximated plaintext, s app , where a fraction of the bits are wrong. For a given rate R and large N , the maximal noise f (for which the decryption could terminate successfully without error bits in the decrypted plaintext) is given by the maximal channel capacity [9] 
Oscar's task to recover s is difficult, since he has to decompose E k into the matrices B −1 and A, which is known to be an NP-complete problem. [10] The main drawbacks of this cryptosystem are: (a) Strong finite size effects which are visible even for large N = O(10 4 ). The decryption typically terminates with some percentages of error bits, which is catastrophic from a practical point of view. (b) For large N , the encryption evolves a product of a matrix (M × N ) E k by the plaintext s, hence its complexity is O(N 2 ). Similarly, the complexity of each step of the decryption is O(N 2 ), eq. (5). Clearly it is less than the cubic complexity of the decryption in RSA. However, if in practice one has to work with N = 10 4 , the reduction in the complexity becomes a drawback. [11] Furthermore, the size of the public-key which has to be downloaded by Alice diverges as O(N 2 ). To overcome these drawbacks, which prevent the usefulness of error-correcting codes as a cryptosystem, we used the following three observations. In error-correcting codes, the nature of the channel typically has a statistical nature; a probability for a bit to flip or a width of the Gaussian noise. Each transmitted bit has the same probability to flip from a given distribution. [9] The first observation is that in a case where an error-correcting method serves as a cryptosystem, Bob can pre-corrupt the public-key E k = B −1 A in the following sense. In a fraction p q of rows, part (all) of the elements are flipped at random. The location of these p q M rows is known only to Bob. Hence, a fraction p q of the ciphertext is corrupted with an average probability 1/2. Since this pre-corruption of E k is common to all ciphertexts, we denote it as a quenched noise, n q . The main purpose of the quenched noise is to make Oscar's task of decomposing E k to B −1 and A more difficult. Note that our cryptosystem works properly for some sub-classes of matrices A and B, but for a random choice our cryptosystem fails with probability one. Hence the task of Oscar is to find a decomposition which works properly as a cryptosystem. The second observation: in addition to the pre-corruption process, Bob publicizes a given fraction, p, of the ciphertext where Alice's private-noise, n a , can be added. This localized private-noise consists of a flip rate f of given pM bits of the ciphertext. The resulting ciphertext then comprises of frozen (non-flipped) bits, randomly flipped bits and flipped bits with probability f . The presence of frozen/flipped bits in the plaintext serves to increase the secure channel and to suppress finite size effects. Similar to Shannon's bound, [9] one can show that for a given rate R the maximal fraction of flipped bits with probability f is
We assume that a fraction p q of the bits are flipped with probability 1/2, however, p c might even be further improved for the following reason. In an error-correction scenario only statistical properties of the plaintext and the flip rate are known, hence any decoded state obeying these statistical features is valid. In contrast, Bob knows the manner in which E k was corrupted and hence the error in the p q M corrupted bits should be consistent with the decrypted plaintext. The most striking observation comes from various simulations on different random constructions of the matrix B, indicating the following rule. As long as the average connectivity, number of non-zero elements per column, of B is smaller than 2, B −1 is sparse. A random construction means that the elements of each row are chosen at a random position, with no spatial structure. Since A is a sparse matrix with random positions of the non-zero elements, it is clear that E k is also sparse. Hence, for such matrices B, the size of the public-key E k scales linearly with the size of the plaintext. Furthermore, the complexity of the decryption process also scales linearly with the size of the plaintext, as the number of iterations is of O(1) (see details below). A comparison with encryption/decryption complexities of the RSA system [2] is presented in figure 1 for various sizes of plaintexts. A sparse public-key is a necessary requisite for an efficient encryption process of large plaintexts, which are of great practical importance. For an average connectivity greater than 2, B −1 is heavily dense, and the number of non-zero elements in E k is around M N/2.
The sparseness of B for a connectivity less than 2 can be supported by the following theoretical argument. Assume that the matrix B is constructed such that B ij = δ i,j + δ i+c,j for i ≤ ρM and B ij = δ i,j for i > ρM , where ρ < 1 and the average connectivity is 1 + ρ < 2. This matrix can easily be inverted and one can show that for c = O(1) B −1 is dense (with a small prefactor), but for c = O(N ), B −1 is sparse. In a random construction the typical distance between two non-zero elements belonging to the same row is of O(N ). With respect to this property it is similar to c = O(N ). Furthermore, for connectivity below 2 the generic graph represented by B is below the percolation threshold.
We perform simulations on R = 1/2 and 256 ≤ N ≤ 2048 with a few different classes of matrices A and B and here we report only limited results. Each parameterization of the matrices A and B was averaged over at least 10 5 plaintexts and 50 realizations. The construction follows the spirit of the constructions for error-correcting codes of the Gaussian channel and R = 1/2. [7] The structure of the matrix B is such that for i ≤ ρM there are two non-zero elements at random positions where for i > ρM there is only one non-zero element. The matrix A is constructed such that in the first ρ ′ M rows there are two non-zero elements and in the remaining rows there are six non-zero elements chosen at random positions. In order to break the inversion symmetry, where each row of A consists of an even number of non-zero elements, a small number of rows were changed from 2 → 1 and 7 → 6 non-zero elements. Note that the spatial separation between different rows of the matrices was done only for demonstration, and to increase the security of the channel one can mix their locations. The performance depends on the success rate of the decryption as a function of (N, p, p q , f ), where the private-noise was added to the first pM bits of the ciphertext. Let us present a few examples among many where the decryption terminates successfully over at least 10 and it becomes negligible as we increase the size of our plaintext. Furthermore, in simulations we realized that the rank of the (1 − p)M correct rows is is ∼ 0.9(1 − p)M . Hence Oscar has to guess additional correct rows and the probability of such an event decreases even further. Last but not least, how does Oscar know that he chose the correct rows? A plausible answer to this question is that any set of additional correct rows results in the same plaintext s. Hence, Oscar may repeat the above attack many times and deduce that the most probable outcome is the desired plaintext. The first difficulty with this scenario is that s has to appear many times as an outcome, since we would like to distinguish between the signal, s, and the noise of other possible outcomes. Secondly, the most probable (exponentially dominated) E part k consists of (N − M (1 − p))f > 0 wrong rows. It is true that all these E part k do not necessarily result in the same plaintext, but their distribution is still in question.
The secret information of Bob is the decomposition of the public-key E k into B −1 and A and the quenched noise ,n q , used to corrupt the public-key. The secret information of Alice is the plaintext s and the private noise, n a . The key point of our signature scheme is that after the decryption process terminates successfully Bob recovers not only the plaintext s but also the private noise, n a , added to the ciphertext. More precisely, on one hand side, from the decryption of the plaintext s Bob knows the corrupted ciphertext by using the corrupted public-key, E k s. On the other hand, Bob has in his hand the received ciphertext, E k s + n a . From the difference between these two pieces of information Bob can easily find n a . The ability of Bob to reveal n a besides the plaintext is at the center of the discussion below. It shows how Alice can use the additional information to sign and to keep the integrity of the message.
A simple signature is based on the following two ingredients: (a) Alice constructs an additional plaintext comprising of a linear combination of s and n a , X(s, n a ). The new plaintext X is encrypted by Alice to a new ciphertext, t 1 , using E k and a new private noise n a1 . Alice transmits to Bob both ciphertexts, t and t 1 . (b) For verification, Alice constructs by a known procedure a verifiable vector, V = V (s, n a , n a1 ). After the decryption of both ciphertexts Bob knows all the ingredients of V and the verification can be carried out. Note that for a one-time signature scheme where Oscar is functioning as an eavesdropper only, our channel is secure. The usefulness of these signature schemes is twofold: (a) The signature/verification procedure is very easy for Alice/Bob to implement with complexities of O(N ). (b) A plaintext repeated twice has in each transmission a different signature due to the different private-noise. The main drawback of the above signature scheme is that Oscar can easily forge a legal plaintext. There are exponentially many plaintexts s and private-noise n a and n a1 which give the same verifiable vector V It appears that in order to have a secret personal signature Alice has (a) to send additional information besides the plaintext; and (b) to use her own known signature scheme based on her cryptosystem, similar to using RSA for both the encryption and signature.
[1] Surprisingly, we demonstrate below that Alice can construct a secure signature without the transmission of any additional information besides the encrypted plaintext.
A simple scenario for an advanced secure signature is one in which Alice first generates a vector V of rank N ′ < N using s and n a following her public protocol. Next, the number of 1's in V is truncated to a fixed number K (or ≤ K) following Alice's public prescription. (For rare events where there are no 1's in V , Alice provides a special procedure). The signature, E part k V is left publicized by Alice, where E part k stands for the relevant rows corresponding to the rank N ′ . Determining V from the knowledge of E k and the signature is known to be a NP-complete problem (pg. 280 in ref. (14)). Bob, who knows s and n a , can easily verify the signature. One can easily make the situation more complex when Alice creates a new cryptosystem in an on-line manner. For instance, based on the public-key, E k , Alice implements some permutations among the rows as a function of the detailed structure of s (and/or n a ). The permutation scheme is publicized by Alice, which may be fixed for all plaintexts/users or can be chosen time dependently. Let us denote the permute public-key by E P k , hence the signature of s is t 1 = E P k V , publicized by Alice but does not have to be transmitted over the channel. Bob first decrypts t and obtains s and n a . Next, Bob finds his permuted public-key, E P k , using the public permutation prescription chosen by Alice, and then easily verifies t 1 from E P k V . Since the signature depends on s and n a as well as on E k , the same plaintext transmitted to different addresses or at different times (different n a ) is characterized by different signatures. As an eavesdropping, Oscar does not know s, n a and also E P k . As a disruptor, Oscar may try to replace the ciphertext t by t ′ consisting of s ′ and n ′ a such that the signature of V = V (n ′ a ) using the permuted public-key E P k (s ′ ) has the same signature as that publicized by Alice. The lack of an independent permuted public-key as a function of the plaintext seems to make the work of a disruptor even harder. In principle Alice can corrupt her signature E P k V either by flipping some bits among a small fraction of the ciphertext or by adding a noise consisting of n a and s. In such a scenario Bob has first to decrypt s and n a and then to verify the decrypted signature with the public protocol of Alice. For a permuted public key the decryption follows the permuted matrices A per = A, and B per is nothing more than the same permutation as made for the rows of E k , but now for the columns of B.
The aim of the authentication procedure is to keep the integrity of the message constructed from a sequence of plaintexts, such that Oscar cannot forge (add/delete) ciphertexts. Using error correcting codes as a cryptosystem this goal can be achieved by using correlated noise for successive ciphertexts. Let us describe some possible scenarios. The private-noise for the first ciphertext is chosen as explained above, where the noise for the next ciphertext is related to the previous one by some permutations. The permutations may depend on (a) the private-noise of the previous ciphertext; (b) the previous plaintext; (c) both the previous ciphertext, and the private-noise. One may think that the permuted noise has to be bounded to the allowed regime by Bob in order to ensure a successful decryption (which can be easily achieved). However, there is no necessity for such a restriction, since after the decryption of the first plaintext, the private-noise of the next ciphertext is uniquely determined and hence also the plaintext.
The advantage of such an authentication scheme is that Bob has only to decrypt the first plaintext, whereas the rest of the message is uniquely defined, since the noise is known. On the other hand, Oscar knows the authentication scheme and may concentrate only on the decryption of the first ciphertext, or alternatively on an intermediate ciphertext (the easy one) which reveals all successive plaintexts. In order to ensure the same security of (almost) all plaintexts, one can use accumulated permutations. The private-noise for the current ciphertext depends on all previous plaintexts/private-noise by a publicized procedure.
The tasks of our cryptosystem can be extended to other functions of the secure channel, such as an undeniable signature. The private-noise is added out of the allowed range such that the decryption cannot terminate successfully without Alice partially revealing her noise.
Alice has to keep as public information all previous signatures. The list of the signatures may load Alice's resources, and furthermore it may take a long time for Bob to find the appropriate signature among many. This drawback can be alleviated by removing the signature into an archive after verification by Bob.
In conclusion, let us briefly discuss a few of the advantages of our cryptosystem over methods based on numbers theory, such as an RSA cryptosystem. First, the matrix operations/belief network decoding in the decryption/encryption process can be carried out and implemented in parallel. Secondly, a one-time success by Oscar to reveal a plaintext does not automatically help or ensure the recovery of other plaintexts that Alice sent to the same Bob. Finally, in the RSA method, for instance, Oscar's task requires a check of many possible trails, where each trail can be examined by the same algorithm. Hence, the task of Oscar can be easily split among many resources. In contrast, our cryptosystem is based on many stochastic ingredients with time dependent features of Alice and Bob. Hence the strategy of Oscar may need to vary between different messages and users of the channel. Even for a given channel, the challenge for future research is to find how to parallelize and to simplify the task of Oscar.
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